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The Chinese Real Estate Bubble 
Abstract 
 China has seen extraordinary economic growth for the past two decades, coupled with a 
booming housing market. Following the 2008 financial crisis, however, observers began 
worrying that the Chinese real estate market had been gripped by a speculative bubble. We use 
residential rent and price data to assess whether these fears are justified. We conclude that 
residential real estate markets are bubbly in Beijing and Shanghai, with the Beijing housing 
market frothier than the Shanghai market.  
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The Chinese Real Estate Bubble 
 In recent years, over a quarter of China’s GDP has been tied to real estate construction 
(Nunlist 2017). Some fear that this growth has been fueled by speculation and that a collapse in 
real-estate prices might trigger an economic crisis not only in China but around the world since 
China is the largest trading country in the world with combined exports and imports worth $4.3 
trillion, and is currently the top trading partner for 16 Asian countries (Thirlwell 2015; Tian 
2018). We investigate the bubbly nature of China’s property boom by using an intrinsic-value 
analysis of residential property prices in Beijing and Shanghai. 
Background 
 A key aspect of China’s evolution from a centrally planned economy has been the transition 
from employer-provided housing to a liberalized housing market. In China, all land belongs to 
the state. Prior to the housing market transition, the government and state-owned entities 
provided living accommodations and there was no private home buying, selling or renting. In 
1998 the Chinese State Council decided to privatize the property market because housing was 
increasingly deteriorating under state control (Xu and Chen 2012). This decision was also 
intended to establish the real estate sector as a new engine for economic growth in the aftermath 
of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Fang, Gu, Xiong, and Zhou 2016). 
 This constitutional amendment set forth a wave of state firms selling homes at highly 
discounted prices to their employees, followed by a surge in housing construction as private 
demand for housing sescalated (Wei, Zhang, and Liu 2017). Local governments now sell “land 
use rights” to property developers, who buy these rights for several decades (typically 70 years) 
and then construct properties on top of the land to sell to the public. 
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 Land is usually more valuable than the house that sits on top of it. Over the course of the last 
two decades, construction costs have remained largely stable (Wu, Gyourko, and Deng 2016) 
and, on average, make up only a third of the value of a house—the rest is land value (Glaeser, 
Huang, Ma, and Shleifer 2017). 
 The funds generated by the sale of land use rights constitutes a very large share of local 
government revenue because China’s tax system provides few and relatively small channels of 
fiscal income. Since the central government requires local governments to achieve periodic 
revenue targets, local governments face substantial pressure to sell land use rights—leading in 
some cases to widely reported ghost cities in some rural areas. 
 From 1998 to 2010, the annual volume of completed private housing units rose from 140 
million square meters to over 610 million (Wu, Deng, and Liu 2017). By 2010, homeownership 
rates reached 84.3 percent of the urban housing stock (Man, Zheng, and Ren 2011). 
 China has sustained an incredible rate of economic expansion since the adoption of free 
market reforms in the 1980s, averaging 9.5 percent real annual GDP growth through 2017. This 
expansion has helped raise approximately 800 million people out of poverty, transforming one of 
the world’s poorest countries to an economic powerhouse, second only to the United States. With 
a large emerging middle class, it is not surprising that the demand for housing has increased. 
 Continued urbanization since the 1980s has also contributed to the housing boom (Wu and 
Liu 2014). In the so-called first-tier cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the 
total population rose from 48 million to 70 million between 2004 to 2012—a 4.8 percent annual 
growth rate compared to the overall 0.5 percent growth rate in China (Fang, Gu, Xiong, and 
Zhou 2016). The combination of growing disposable incomes and rapid rural-urban migration 
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naturally increased the demand for housing, especially in more desirable and highly urbanized 
areas. 
 In China, real estate is considered a primary investment vehicle, as there are few accessible 
and stable investment alternatives. China’s stock market has been far more volatile than the U.S. 
market (Figure 1). For example, Chinese stock prices more than quintupled between January 
2005 and October 2007, followed by a 70 percent decline over the next 12 months. Eighty 
percent of the trading volume on the Shanghai Stock Exchange is by individual investors, whose 
trading behavior is generally not well informed and unpredictable (Ren 2017). 
 In addition to its volatility, the Chinese stock market is still poorly regulated and dominated 
by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that offer relatively unattractive dividends (Chen and Wen 
2017), and access to investment opportunities abroad remains limited (Goldman Sachs 2016). 
 On average, housing prices demonstrated more resiliency than stock prices through the 
2008-2009 global economic crisis and provided larger returns (Fang, Gu, Xiong, and Zhou 
2016). Figure 2 compares Chinese stock prices to an index of second-hand house prices in 
Shanghai going back to December 1993 (GlobalPropertyGuide 2019). In comparison to the stock 
market, residential real estate seems to be a better investment because it has had a relatively 
attractive return with considerably less volatility. This is the kind of backward/looking, trend-
chasing behavior that fuels speculative bubbles, and is surely part of the lure of real estate. 
 A strong culture of homeownership among the Chinese has also contributed to the 
extraordinary growth of property prices, especially as it intersects with the new wealth generated 
by a robust Chinese economy. A considerable sex imbalance has existed in China for several 
decades, due largely to an ingrained cultural preference for male children, exacerbated by the 
!4
one-child policy enacted from 1979 to 2015. Wei, Zhang and Liu (2017) argue that one 
consequence of this sex imbalance is that homeownership boosts a person’s competitiveness in 
marriage, as it is perceived as a sign of status. 
 Yang, Zhang, and Zhou (2012) argue that reduced fertility (from the one-child policy) and a 
larger sex imbalance (skewed towards males) have also increased saving, which creates greater 
purchasing power in the real estate market and drives up housing demand and consequently 
prices.  
 Another important cultural characteristic that may be driving up housing prices is that 
Chinese parents often provide for their children well into their adulthoods and, in old age, 
parents tend to depend on their children (Glaeser, Huang, Ma, and Shleifer 2017). In conjunction 
with China’s new wealth, many Chinese parents have been helping their children buy homes. 
Chinese households under the age of 35 have a homeownership rate of 55 percent, compared to 
37 percent in the United States (Glaeser, Huang, Ma, and Shleifer 2017).  
Bubble Concerns 
 Many find the current state of the Chinese real estate market worrying, and point to the rapid 
growth in property prices as a sign of a housing bubble. From 2003 to 2013, China’s first-tier 
cities—Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen—experienced a real property price growth 
rate of 13.1 percent annually. China’s second-tier and third-tier cities experienced real property 
price growth of 10.5 percent and 7.9 percent, respectively (McMahon 2018). Chinese billionaire 
and real estate magnate Wang Jianlin has warned that Chinese real estate is the “biggest bubble 
in history.” (Mullen, and Stevens 2016)  
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 Others argue that such worries are overblown. China’s housing boom is very different from 
the U.S. boom in the mid-2000s, which was fueled by a surge in lax loan requirements, subprime 
lending, and the securitization of questionable mortgages. In 2008, more than half of all U.S. 
mortgages were subprime and had down payments of near zero percent (Wallison 2017). China’s 
housing market does not have the same issues because there are much stricter mortgage lending 
standards and higher down payment requirements—30 percent for the purchase of a first home 
and 60 to 80 percent for subsequent home purchases, depending on the purpose of the home 
(Fang, Gu, Xiong, and Zhou 2016, Zheng 2017).  
 Chen and Wen (2017) argue that China’s housing boom and price appreciation are natural 
given the rapid expansion, industrialization, and urbanization of the economy. It is rational for 
the widespread anticipation of an expansion of future demand for property to cause prices to rise. 
This only becomes a problem if economic growth slows but future expectations for price growth 
remain irrationally high. 
 Using the principle of regression to the mean, Pritchett and Summers (2014) predict that 
China’s economic growth will slow significantly towards the two percent average worldwide. 
This forecast bodes poorly for the Chinese real estate market because a regression in economic 
growth is likely to undermine the income and price expectations that make housing appear to be 
a good investment. 
 Fang, Gu, Xiong, and Zhou (2016) argue that the significant growth in disposable incomes 
has fueled and explains the rise in property prices. However, the relevant question is not whether 
buying (and renting) are becoming more or less affordable, but whether home ownership is 
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justified by the rent savings; i.e., whether market prices are consistent with the intrinsic value of 
the prospective cash flow from owning a home. 
 A speculative bubble occurs when an asset’s price rises far above the present value of the 
cash flow because buyers are not buying for the cash flow, but to sell for higher prices. In 
residential housing, the cash flow is the rent received (or the rent saving if owner-occupied), net 
of property taxes, maintenance, and other expenses (Smith and Smith 2006). 
 We will directly assess the “bubbliness” of the Chinese real estate market by comparing 
market prices to intrinsic-value estimates using matched-pair data for homes that were recently 
rented or purchased in Beijing and Shanghai. 
Methodology  
 Most measures of speculative bubbles focus on rapidly increasing prices (Kindleberger 
1987). However, price increases might be justified if intrinsic values are increasing, too, or if 
prices were initially below intrinsic values. The real measure of a speculative bubble is a direct 
comparison of market prices with intrinsic-value estimates. 
 The intrinsic value of an owner-occupied home is the net present value (NPV) of the 
expected cash flows from owning the home, which is the rent one would otherwise have to pay, 
net of the expenses of home ownership (Smith and Smith 2006): 
  
where 𝑋0 is the initial down payment and closing costs. The subsequent cash flows represent the 
rent that the owner would have to otherwise pay if he or she were renting instead, minus the 
mortgage payments, property taxes, maintenance costs, and other expenses relating to 
NPV = X0 + X1(1+R)1 + X2(1+R)2 +…+ Xn(1+R)n
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homeownership. The required rate of return, R, depends on the returns from alternative 
investments. 
 There are also non-financial costs and benefits of home ownership (for example, anxiety over 
possible costly repairs, flexibility in customizing a home, and the pride and status accruing to 
homeowners), but these are hard to value and are typically ignored. 
 To assess the intrinsic value of a home, we can assume an infinite holding period—not 
because the home will never be resold, but because we do not want the intrinsic value estimate to 
depend on an assumed sale price This is the same assumption made for assessing the intrinsic 
value of stocks. 
 If the NPV is positive, then buying a home is better than renting it, and the market price is 
justified by the anticipated cash flow. If NPV is negative, then the market prices is not justified, 
so buyers are evidently counting on price appreciation; i.e., they are speculating. Alternatively, if 
the NPV is monotonically inversely related to the required return, we can calculate the internal 
rate of return (IRR) that equates the NPV to the market price. If the IRR is less than the required 
return, the market price is higher than the intrinsic value of the cash flow. 
Data  
 Our rental and sale data come from 链家 (“Lianjia”), one of China’s largest real estate 
brokerage firms. All of the homes we consider are residential apartment properties in China’s 
two largest cities, Beijing and Shanghai, and the data span the nine-month period from June 2018 
to February 2019. The rental and sale price information include data on location, number of 
rooms, size, transaction date, price, asking price, facing direction, general floor level ((low, low-
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middle, middle, high-middle, or high), total number of floors in the building, year built, and days 
on market between initial posting and transaction closing. 
 These data can only be accessed through the company’s mobile app—it is not available to the 
public on a desktop or laptop. The Lianjia website requires a user to input a Chinese cellphone 
number on its website login page. A confirmation code is sent to the phone number and must 
then be inputted to the website login page. Once logged in, past home sales and rental transaction 
data can be found under the section title “查交易”, which translates to “check past transactions.” 
The house sale and rental transactions were then manually matched based on the criteria 
discussed below.  
 There are 16 and 15 districts, respectively, within Beijing and Shanghai. Of these districts, 
we selected the primary districts in and surrounding the city center. For Beijing, the selected 
metropolitan areas are Xicheng, Dongcheng, Haidian, Chaoyang, Shunyi and Tongzhou. For 
Shanghai, they are Pudong, Xuhui, Baoshan, Putuo, Yangpu, Minhang, Changning and Jiading. 
The data collected for Beijing and Shanghai totaled 404 and 405 matched pairs of homes, 
respectively. The breakdown of the matched pairs in each city are in Tables 1 and 2. 
 Table 3 shows that the typical homes appear to be small and expensive but, to gauge whether 
the prices are justified, we need to compare rents and prices for individually matched pairs of 
homes. 
 In selecting the matched pairs, several conditions had to be met. Homes had to be within the 
same apartment complex, which eliminated differences in building style, age and location. The 
apartment buildings had to have approximately the same number of floors, and the apartments 
themselves had to share the same general floor level (low, low-middle, middle, high-middle, or 
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high). Matched apartments had the same number of bedrooms and bathrooms, and less than a 10 
percent differential in square meterage. Lastly, matched apartments had to share a common 
direction among eight possible facing directions: north, northeast, east, southeast, south, 
southwest, west, and northwest.  
Analysis 
 Our default assumptions are: initial closing costs equal to 2 percent of the sale price, a 30-
year mortgage, 1.5 percent annual maintenance costs, 2 percent sales transaction cost, 20 percent 
capital gains tax, and no property tax. 
 We consider a 30 percent down payment for a first home purchase and a 60 percent down 
payment for later home purchases. During the time period we studied, the mortgage rate in 
Beijing was 5.5 percent for a first home purchase and 6.0 percent for a subsequent home 
purchase. For Shanghai, the mortgage rates were 5.0 percent and 5.25 percent, respectively (The 
People’s Bank of China). A variety of assumptions were made for the model’s other parameters 
to assess the robustness of our results. 
 The NPV calculations with an infinite horizon make no assumptions about future home prices. 
For our NPV calculations using a finite horizon, the baseline assumption for the annual increase 
in home prices is 2 percent since the average rate of inflation has been 2.41 percent over the last 
decade and 1.76 percent over the last five years (Figure 3). We focus on the calculated IRRs to 
facilitate comparisons with other potential investments. 
 Tables 4 and 5 summarize the IRR calculations for the 404 matched pairs of homes in Beijing 
and the 405 matched pairs in Shanghai. The N/A entries are for cases where there is no IRR 
because the NPV is always negative, no matter what the discount rate. With 2 percent and 3 
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percent rent, price, and expense appreciation, the IRRs are often negative and clearly 
unattractive. Even for long horizons with rents and prices increasing by 5 percent annually while 
expenses increase by only 3 percent, the IRRs seem unappealing. During the period of time 
covered by this study, China’s 10-year government bond yield ranged from 3.2 to 3.6 percent. 
Since housing investments are significantly less liquid and there is considerable uncertainty 
about future house prices, a risk premium of at least two percent seems necessary (Wu, Gyourko 
and Deng 2012), which implies close to a six percent required rate of return for real estate. 
People who bought homes in Beijing or Shanghai as an investment during this time period were 
evidently anticipating rapidly rising home prices. 
 Home ownership may become even less financially appealing if substantial land-use renewal 
fees and/or property taxes are imposed. 
Possible Fees and Taxes 
 When a land use agreement expires, the owner can apply for an extension, but there are no 
guarantees about the cost of obtaining an extension. Article 22 of the Law on the Administration 
of Urban Real Estate says that renewals will normally be approved, but that “the land user shall 
enter into a new contract for the granting of the land-use right and pay fees for the granting in 
accordance with the relevant regulations.” The size of these fees is not specified. 
 Many residents of Wenzhou had 20-year land-use agreements that are now expiring. The 
government initially said that the renewal-fees would be up to 33 percent of the property’s value, 
but in 2016 it was announced that the proposed fees would be waived. The government 
cautioned, however, that this was a transitional decision and they would continue to study the 
question of renewal fees (Cole 2016). 
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 One possibility is that the Chinese government might charge renewal fees based on current 
market values. However, large lump-sum fees are likely to be perceived as unfair and 
unaffordable for many home owners (Stein 2017). A less disruptive alternative would be to allow 
renewal fees to be paid in annual installments, akin to property taxes, or to impose explicit 
property taxes in lieu of renewal fees. Such annual payments would satisfy local municipalities’ 
desire for a stable source of revenue and would probably be viewed by citizens as a fair and 
reasonable way of paying for local government services (Stein 2017). 
 For several years now, the Chinese government has been considering instituting property 
taxes to provide a steady source of revenue for local governments and to defuse possible housing 
bubbles (Bloomberg 2012). The Shanghai and Chongqing municipal governments were allowed 
to begin levying real estate taxes in 2011. In Shanghai there are annual taxes on 70 percent of the 
original property value at rates of 0.6 percent for taxable houses worth at least as the city average 
and 0.4 percent for others. In Chongqing the annual taxes are based on 100 percent of the 
original property value, and are 1.2 percent for houses worth at least four times the city average, 
1.0 percent for three to four times the city average, and 0.5 percent for others (Bai, Li, and 
Ouyang 2012). Shanghai also levies an annual land-use tax on owners of land-use rights at rates 
ranging from RMB 1.50 (USD 0.221) to RMB 30 (USD 4.38) per square meter. 
 In 2014, the Chinese government announced that when property taxes become widespread, 
the tax rates will be set by local governments rather than the central government, and should be 
based on the market value of a property with a minimum tax-free level to protect ordinary home 
owners (Reuters 2014). 
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 Table 6 shows how the median IRRs are affected by annual property tax rates equal to 0.5 
and 1.0 percent of current market values for the case of a first home purchase and the favorable 
assumptions of annual increases of 5 percent for rents and home prices, and 3 percent for 
expenses. With an infinite horizon, the median IRRs drop by up to 0.5 percent. The effects are 
even larger with finite horizons. Since the property taxes, if any, will be imposed at some 
unknown future date, the actual median IRRs are somewhere between the case of no property 
taxes and the values shown in Table 6, which assume that the property taxes begin immediately. 
Discussion  
 Our results indicate that the Beijing and Shanghai housing markets are in a bubble, where 
market prices are significantly above intrinsic values. 
 Cracks have already appeared in parts of the Chinese housing sector, as evidenced by the 
widely reported ghost cities throughout the country. If the Chinese economy slows significantly 
and household incomes drop, the demand for housing, especially in smaller cities, will decline 
and lead to more ghost cities. Furthermore, if household incomes drop, mortgage payments will 
become more burdensome, as price-to-income ratios in these major Chinese cities are already 
very high. If a major price correction occurs, local government revenue will also be adversely 
impacted, which will further impair economic growth. 
 Additionally, if the housing sector becomes a less attractive investment, capital outflows may 
occur as investors consider foreign investment opportunities, especially as China embraces 
economic liberalization (Ding, Huang, TJin, and Lam 2017). Given the interconnected nature of 
real estate, the overall economy, and the government, a housing price correction might set off a 
vicious cycle culminating in a major economic downturn like the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
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 It is precisely because the possible consequences of a housing crash in China are so 
frightening that the Chinese government is unlikely to stand by and let it happen. The real estate 
market is too big to fail: 
[T]he government does not wish to create or exacerbate social unrest. If the past is a 
reliable guide, the central government will do whatever it takes to keep the residential 
market calm and homeowners placid. The very last thing the government wants to do is act 
in a way that causes hundreds of millions of citizens to believe that their single largest 
asset is unstable…. It is nearly inconceivable that the central government will act in any 
way that shakes the confidence of the many recent homebuyers who believe that their home 
is a solid investment of great and ever-increasing value. (Stein 2017) 
 As the housing market evolves, the Chinese government will continue to tinker with housing 
regulations that might support and stabilize the market; for example, the recent hikes in down 
payment requirements and the Shanghai and Chongqing pilot property taxes (Chen and Yao 
2017; Thomson Reuters 2019). The government might also prop up housing prices by slowing 
the growth of new housing construction. 
 If the air begins leaking out of the bubble, the government is likely to intervene through laws, 
regulations, or outright purchases to prevent a collapse. The Chinese housing bubble will most 
likely end with a whimper, not a bang. 
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Table 1. Beijing Matched Pairs of Homes District Breakdown 
  Subdistricts Matched Pairs 
 Xicheng 16 67 
 Dongcheng 11 48 
 Haidian 21 182 
 Chaoyang 5 46 
 Shunyi 4 48 
 Tongzhou  1 13 
 Total 58 404 
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Table 2. Shanghai Matched Pairs of Homes, District Breakdown  
  Subdistricts Matched Pairs 
 Pudong 4 58 
 Xuhui 4 55 
 Baoshan 8 139 
 Putuo  5 53 
 Y angpu 3 25 
 Minhang 2 40 
 Changning 1 22 
 Jiading  1 13 
 Total 28 405  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Table 3. Characteristics of Housing Sample Data 
 Average number Median Median Median Median  
 of Rooms SQM Monthly Rent Price Price/SQM  
 Beijing 1.75 61.50 $954 $707,750 $11,517  
 Shanghai 1.64  55.59  $611 $409,750 $6,925 
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Table 4. Beijing IRRs 
  1st home  2nd home  1st home  2nd home  1st home  2nd home  
Assumptions    
 Down Payment 30% 60% 30% 60% 30% 60% 
 Mortgage Rate 5.50% 6.00% 5.50% 6.00% 5.50% 6.00% 
 Annual Price Increase  2.00% 2.00%  3.00% 3.00%  5.00% 5.00% 
 Annual Rent Increase  2.00% 2.00% 3.00% 3.00%  5.00% 5.00% 
 Annual Expenses Increase  2.00% 2.00%  3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 
Results        
 First-year median IRR  -18.43% -7.12%  -15.10% -5.48% -9.28% -2.56% 
 10-year median IRR  -4.52% -1.05%  -2.17% 0.29% 2.18% 3.02% 
 30-year median IRR  -0.34% 0.50%  1.11% 1.68% 4.31% 4.38% 
 Forever median IRR  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 5.89% 5.79% 
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Table 5. Shanghai IRRs 
  1st home  2nd home  1st home  2nd home  1st home  2nd home  
Assumptions        
 Down Payment  30% 60% 30% 60% 30% 60% 
 Mortgage Rate  5.00% 5.25% 5.00% 5.25% 5.00% 5.25% 
 Annual Price Increase  2.00% 2.00%  3.00% 3.00% 5.00% 5.00% 
 Annual Rent Increase  2.00% 2.00%  3.00% 3.00% 5.00% 5.00% 
 Annual Expenses Increase  2.00% 2.00%  3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 
Results        
 First-year median IRR  -16.50% -6.22%  -13.20% -4.58% -7.44% -1.68% 
 10-year median IRR  -3.17% -0.26%  -0.92% 1.05% 3.27% 3.72% 
 30-year median IRR  0.27% 1.02%  1.70% 2.17% 4.87% 4.84% 
 Forever median IRR  2.18% 2.18%  3.16% 3.16% 6.09% 6.09%  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Table 6. Effect of Property Taxes, First home, 5% price, 5% rent, and 3% expense increase 
               Shanghai                                Beijing           
Assumptions        
 Mortgage Rate 5.00%  5.00%  5.00% 5.50%  5.50%  5.50% 
 Property tax rate 0% 0.5% 1.0%  0% 0.5% 1.0% 
Results  
 First-year median IRR -7.44% -8.05% -8.66% -9.28% -9.89% -10.50% 
 10-year median IRR 3.27% 2.27% 1.27% 2.18% 1.18% 0.18% 
 30-year median IRR  4.87% 4.16% 3.47% 4.31% 3.63% 2.95% 
 Forever median IRR 6.09% 5.79% 5.59% 5.89% 5.64% 5.49% 
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Figure 1. U.S. and China Stock Prices, monthly 
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Figure 2 Shanghai Stock Market Prices and Prices of Second-Hand Homes in Shanghai  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Figure 3 China Inflation Rate
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